




























































Many ambitious projects have attempted 
to grasp the European Union's influence 
on employment policies in Member Sta-
tes in the past (Barcevičius et al. 2014; 
Graziano et al. 2011, Büchs 2007; Zeitlin 
and Pochet 2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 
2009). Embedded in the Europeanization 
literature and new modes of governance 
research, these scholars have taken on 
the task of exploring causal mechanisms 
that stand between the EU as a cause and 
the policy changes that it might have tri-
ggered. However, the financial and eco-
nomic crisis led to large-scale changes 
in the EU's socio-economic governance. 
The European Semester was created as a 
yearly cycle of policy surveillance which 
integrates a number of fiscal, macroeco-
nomic, employment and social gover-
nance mechanisms. Knowing how the 
European Semester influences domestic 
policy change is still a research deside-
ratum (Verdun and Zeitlin 2017). This 
paper takes the case of Croatia and poses 
the questions as to in what way, under 
which conditions and to what extent the 
European Semester architecture influen-
ces Croatian employment policies.
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Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of the European Semester, Eu's framework 
for socio-economic policy coordination, on change of Croatian employment policy. 
The case of Croatia is used to illustrate in what manner, under which conditions 
and to what extent the European Semester architecture actually influences Croa-
tian employment policies. The focus is on two policy items: the youth Guarantee 
and the retirement age provision. The findings on the youth Guarantee lend crucial 
support to the expectation that intensified monitoring and reporting obligations 
will contribute to domestic policy change. Drawing on interview data, the author 
identifies administrative pressure and low familiarity with the European Commis-
sion's modus operandi within the European Semester as two crucial elements of 
influence. on the other hand, Croatia repeatedly neglected Eu's recommendation 
to step up the harmonization of female and male retirement age. reasons for low 
European Semester impact on this issue can be found in a number of constraining 
conditions that were at play: coalition politics, the stickiness of the policy issue, op-
posite policy beliefs and a highly uncertain political situation. These factors acted 
as deterrents from policy change despite potential Eu sanctions down the pike.

























European economic governance after 
the crisis has been troubled by tough 
choices – should the new governance 
framework tighten the monitoring and 
enforcement capacity of supranational 
actors, or is the EU to step up and in-
tensify alternative, soft methods of co-
ordinating economic and social (incl. 
employment) policies? I start from the 
assumption that this tension has been re-
flected in the institutional development 
of economic governance post-crisis. In 
exploring interlinkages of governance 
procedures on the one hand and inten-
sified multilateral surveillance, moni-
toring and reporting obligations on the 
other, I focus on two policy items – the 
Youth Guarantee and the retirement age 
provision. The findings on the Youth 
Guarantee lend crucial support to the 
expectations which intensified monitor-
ing and reporting obligations contribute 
to domestic policy innovation. Drawing 
on interview data, I identify administra-
tive pressure and low familiarity with the 
European Commission's1 modus operan-
di within the European Semester as two 
crucial elements in the chain of influ-
ence. On the other hand, Croatia repeat-
edly neglected EU's recommendation 
to step up the harmonization of female 
and male retirement age. Reasons can 
be found in coalition politics, the stick-
iness of the policy issue, opposite policy 
beliefs, as well as in a highly uncertain 
political situation, all of which acted as 
deterrents from policy change despite 
potential sanctioning down the road.
The paper continues as follows. The 
first section describes the procedural 
functioning of the European Semester, 
followed by a review of the newest in-
novations within employment coordi-
nation at EU level. Section 3 introduces 
the analytical framework including the 
1 Hereafter, the terms ''European Commis-
sion'' and ''Commission'' will be used inter-
changeably.
causal pathways, conditions and aspects 
of policy change that can be expected to 
result from European Semester sources 
of influence. Section 4 looks at the Eu-
ropean Semester in play and analyzes 
the Youth Guarantee and retirement age 
items in Croatia. The final section is the 
conclusion to the paper.
The European Semester: 
Streamlining Policy 
Coordination in the EU
Facing a severe financial crisis that 
grew into a full-fledged economic re-
cession and sovereign debt crisis, Eu-
ropean leaders were anxious to cushion 
the negative effects of the crisis: firstly, 
on the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), and, secondly, on the EU's ove-
rall economy (Verdun 2015: 223-224). 
Among other crisis-management tools, 
the EU passed a series of acts, such as 
the Six-pack and the Two-pack regula-
tion which increased the Commission's 
authority over budgetary and macroe-
conomic monitoring (Savage and Ver-
dun 2016: 101). These reforms ampli-
fied the punitive aspect of economic 
governance, both in the Stability and 
Growth Pact and in the new Macroe-
conomic Imbalance Procedure (Mar-
tínez-Yáñez 2016: 529), although these 
sanctioning mechanisms are yet to be 
applied against Member States in pra-
ctice. One of key governance innova-
tions introduced in 2010 as part of the 
broader Six-pack was the European Se-
mester2 – an annual cycle of socio-eco-
nomic surveillance which brings toget-
her and streamlines existing coordinati-
on efforts, i.e. the Europe 2020 agenda, 
the Stability and Growth Pact, the Ma-
croeconomic Imbalance Procedure and 
the Euro Plus Pact. In effect, it monitors 
the implementation of (fiscal) rules 
2 In this paper, the term ''European Seme-





























































and guidelines of all coordination me-
chanisms, some of which rely more on 
soft coordination (Euro Plus Pact and 
Europe 2020), whereas others combine 
soft and hard (law) tools (the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the Macroecono-
mic Imbalance Procedure) (Bekker and 
Klosse 2014: 8). The European Semester 
starts by outlining the following year's 
economic priorities (Annual Growth 
Survey). The Commission then analy-
zes fiscal and socio-economic develop-
ments in Member States, including pro-
gress towards area-specific guidelines 
and recommendations for the previous 
year (Country Report). Country Re-
ports are followed by National Reform 
Programs submitted by governments. 
These describe efforts made or to be 
made in order to meet EU-targets, ru-
les and recommendations. The Europe-
an Commission assesses reforms and 
drafts country-specific recommendati-
ons (CSRs) addressed to each Member 
States. The remaining six months are 
reserved for national implementation. 
This paper tries to understand what 
sort of a capacity the European seme-
ster architecture has so as to influence 
domestic employment policies. Before I 
move to the analytical framework, the 
following section explains how employ-
ment coordination fits within the Eu-
ropean Semester.
EU Employment Coordination 
in the European Semester
Employment coordination traditionally 
operates within the context of a "new 
mode of governance" termed the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), which 
can be contrasted to what Scott and Tru-
bek (2002) call ‘the classic Community 
method' – the usual decision-making 
process in the EU. The OMC is often 
termed "soft law" (Mosher and Trubek 
2003) because of the non-binding chara-
cter of policy guidelines or recommen-
dations that are issued. Member States 
cannot be forced by law to translate EU-
agreed employment goals into domestic 
action. Although EU institutions have 
the right to define common goals and 
targets, they have no competencies to 
directly regulate the coordinated policy. 
Furthermore, the OMC is characterized 
by the absence of sanctioning mechani-
sms. Finally, policy coordination ope-
rates within the context of soft policy 
instruments such as guidelines, targets, 
indicators (benchmarking), mutual lear-
ning, peer reviewing and other non-in-
trusive mechanisms. These are intended 
to spell out common goals, scrutinize 
national policy trends and action, and 
facilitate voluntary transfer of policies 
through deliberation and learning from 
successful examples. It is believed that 
soft coordination can build consensus 
and enhance convergence between co-
untries in areas in which Member States 
resist deeper integration (Heritier 2003).
In the framework of the European 
Semester, new employment guidelines 
and objectives are defined every five 
years, with Member States receiving 
employment-related recommendations 
on a yearly basis. However, some inter-
esting trends were noted since the start 
of the Semester. Despite fears following 
the initial iterations of the Semester that 
employment and social policies would 
be subdued to the objectives of fiscal 
consolidation and macroeconomic sta-
bility, a gradual process of "socializa-
tion" of the Semester was distinguished 
(Zeitlin 2016: 1084). According to some 
commentators, this meant a re-install-
ment of the social and employment di-
mension in the Semester – in the form 
of an expanded social scope of recom-
mendations (Gomez Urquijo 2017), the 
enhanced role of the Employment Com-
mittee in extending mutual learning op-
portunities and peer reviews and new 
























tion with the Social Protection Commit-
tee (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014). How-
ever, others claim that the tightening of 
the economic governance procedures 
has meant more intrusions of fiscal and 
macroeconomic objectives into welfare 
state policies than before the reform pe-
riod (De la Porte and Heins 2015: 3-4). 
In practical terms, this trend is reflected 
in those country-specific recommenda-
tions legally based in the more stringent 
procedures of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure, but nevertheless increasingly 
include suggestions for interventions in 
the social and employment field. Since 
the two coordination processes rely on 
strict enforcement and monitoring, they 
effectively diminish Member States' 
"room for maneuver" in the labor mar-
ket policy, social policy proper, health-
care or pension systems (11). As I will 
demonstrate in the coming section, 
these two trends have significant impli-
cations on the capacity of the European 
Semester to influence the national (em-
ployment) policy arena.
A Framework for Analyzing 
European Semester Influence
The main interest of this paper is to inve-
stigate how (by means of which mecha-
nisms) and under which conditions the 
European Semester manages to influence 
domestic policy changes in the field of 
employment policies. In doing so, this pa-
per sides with Gerven et al. (2014: 509) in 
their opinion that a thorough understan-
ding of Europeanization processes neces-
sitates a deeper inquiry into the mechani-
sms of influence, rather than an illusory 
attempt to simply establish relationships 
of direct impact. By building on the two 
trends in socio-economic governance 
from the previous section, I conceptua-
lize the European Semester governance 
features as sources of influence on do-
mestic policy change. Empirical analysis 
has thus far been scarce; however, some 
studies found either limited impact of 
country-specific recommendations (De 
la Porte and Heins 2015: 13; Hallerberg 
et al. 2012) or a poor implementation re-
cord of CSRs (Deroose and Griesse 2014; 
Zuleeg 2015). Others noted an increased 
politicization of employment recommen-
dations as they became a reference point 
to stakeholders and the media (Louvaris 
Fasois 2016), or the strategic usage of 
specific targets ("cherry-picking") in the 
European Semester framework (Eihma-
nis 2017).
Mechanisms
The starting point of the causal analysis 
is the presence of a misfit between EU 
targets/goals/guidelines/indicators and 
domestic policy. This paper assumes 
that a more pronounced policy misfit 
leads to an increased pressure to adapt3 
(Börzel and Risse 2000). I extract four 
principle mechanisms from the litera-
ture (see: Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 
2016; Barcevičius 2014; De la Porte and 
3 As critics rightly point out, the goodness of 
fit is by no means a necessary condition for 
policy change (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 
2016). This is especially true in the sphere of 
soft law such as employment policy. How-
ever, this paper holds that any impulses 
from the EU-level that would point to 
bad goodness of fit can become sources of 
domestic political usage, depending on the 
preferences and belief systems of domes-
tic actors. A large-scale misfit may thus 
empower two fronts : (1) policy-makers who 
exploit the opportunity to point to the mis-
fit in order to advance a pre-existing agenda 
or preference and hence to legitimize an 
action; (2) societal actors, if influential 
enough to stir public debate and, since 
inclined towards change, may make strate-
gic reference to the high misfit to build pro-
change coalitions. Also, if the government 
perceives the large misfit as an indicator of 
policy failure, it may search for solutions on 
the EU level and engage in drawing lessons 
from other Member States. In that case, the 
presence of policy entrepreneurs will be 




























































Pochet 2012) which may form the causal 
pathway between cause and effect. The 
first mechanism relates to external in-
centives in the Semester – either positive 
incentives or sanctions to which Member 
States react. These can be rule-based cri-
teria (i.e. SGP rules) backed by sanctions 
triggered in absence of policy change. 
External constrains can also take the 
form of naming-and-shaming practices 
which rely on the publicity of European 
semester outputs. Policy-makers calcu-
late potential reputational or electoral 
losses in the course of non-compliance 
with proposed policy changes. Posi-
tive incentives (awards), such as access 
to funding, are attached to substantive 
conditions of the European Semester. 
The relationship between the European 
Semester and the ESF has been boosted 
via the 2013 funding regulations reform. 
On the one hand, Member States must 
comply with pre-specified employment 
objectives, ex-ante conditionalities and 
target expenditures relevant to the CSRs 
in order to become eligible for funding. 
On the other hand, however, the Europe-
an Commission may require reprogram-
ming of funds to support a CSR and the 
objectives of the SGP/MIP, or propose 
suspensions in case of no action, which 
leads to a further hardening of CSRs. As a 
consequence, the use of ESF money is less 
flexible and more centrally controlled 
than ever before (Armstrong 2012: 294).
A second mechanism (leverage effect) 
describes a frequent phenomenon where 
governments and other actors selectively 
cherry-pick from the plethora of EU ini-
tiatives or ideas and use them as levers to 
boost their influence in policy-making 
processes, in building coalitions or legit-
imizing their action (Woll and Jacquot 
2008). Peer pressure (third mechanism) 
can mean either (1) persuasion by peers 
(other Member States or EU officials) 
to change domestic policies in order to 
pursue collective EU goals, whereby na-
tional policymakers become convinced 
about the right courses of action, or (2) 
extensive and frequent pressure on do-
mestic public administration to report 
back on progress or state of affairs in a 
certain policy matter, and in-depth EU 
scrutiny of the domestic policy field. 
The European Semester encourages en-
hanced interaction between European 
Commission administration and nation-
al administrations through intensified 
monitoring and feedback exercises relat-
ed to planned policy actions. The mul-
ti-level governance arrangements creat-
ed therein are interactive and formally 
non-hierarchical; however, Commission 
officials aim to ensure that national ad-
ministrators adhere to both the overall 
EU-level objectives of the European Se-
mester and to country-specific measures 
and targets. Administrative pressure 
thus relates to instances in which civil 
servants of different Commission DGs 
engage in frequent remote and on-the-
ground surveillance of national policy 
progress and request repeated in-depth 
reporting on planned and executed pol-
icy measures by competent authorities. 
These measures are to aim at meeting 
pre-defined policy goals in the Euro-
pean Semester framework. The Euro-
pean Commission seeks to push and 
steer domestic reform processes in that 
direction. Member States must now re-
port on the implementation of CSRs, 
provide detailed intelligence on the con-
tent of undertaken policy measures and 
comply with deadlines for responding 
to requests (Bekker 2013: 5). Intense 
monitoring and reporting activities are 
hence expected to increase the pressure 
to comply with EU requests (Maggetti 
and Gilardi 2014: 1295).
A final mechanism, mutual learn-
ing in the European Semester, pertains 
to all forms of collective learning4 that 

























occur in EU fora such as the Employ-
ment Committee (EMCO) or the Em-
ployment, Social Policy, Health and 
Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO). 
Mutual learning is generated when ac-
tors alter their understanding of policy 
goals, means and problems in a process 
of learning. However, policy-makers do 
not consider changing policies due to 
suggestions by their peers, but as the 
result of reflection and autonomous 
conviction about the appropriateness 
to address certain policy problems. The 
literature has noted that the importance 
of the EMCO in enhancing European 
Semester's influence increased by way of 
its intensified monitoring capacity, fre-
quency and type of peer review activities 
it organizes (both ex-post and ex-ante), 
the potential for mutual learning it cre-
ates and substantive influence on the 
content of country-specific recommen-
dations it is said to have (see: Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke 2014).
Intervening Conditions
This paper distinguishes between do-
mestic and EU-level factors (conditi-
ons) that either facilitate or inhibit the 
causal pathway. Domestically, Member 
States belonging to the group of Euro-
zone countries face tighter monitoring 
and can be subjected to financial sancti-
ons under the preventive and corrective 
arms of the SGP and MIP which makes 
"compliance" more likely (Bekker 2015: 
4). If both popular and elite (govern-
ment) sentiment towards the EU and 
the European Commission is positive, 
Member States will be more open to 
(even unpopular) initiatives from Bru-
ssels. In countries with coalition gover-
nments, pivotal coalition parties might 
act as veto players if a policy chan-
ge would be to the detriment of their 
constituency5. Unlike Cacciatore et al. 
5 The same argument works in a similar 
manner with single-party governments 
(2016: 1191), I expect national admi-
nistrations to be more likely to accept 
input from Brussels the less accustomed 
they are to EU practices and procedu-
res, simply because they have not learnt 
how to "play the Brussels game" yet in 
novel circumstances. They might the-
refore be more permissive in engaging 
with EU requests uncritically. Finally, it 
is worth noticing Deroose and Griesse's 
(2014: 6) finding that states tend not to 
implement recommendations neither 
in election years ¸nor in the aftermath 
of elections. I would add to this that 
popular EU incentives will be used re-
gardless of election proximity whenever 
they can be used as a lever in the ele-
ction campaign. On the European level, 
I also side with deliberative intergover-
nmentalism in arguing that the effecti-
veness of multilateral surveillance and 
mutual learning depends on the ability 
of key policy-makers to "grasp technical 
knowledge" during EU-level delibera-
tion, and the closeness and frequency 
of their inter actions with senior civil 
servants (Puetter 2012: 165). In rela-
tion to this matter, it has been argued 
by Puetter (2014) that informal settin-
gs and working methods conducive to 
consensus-building and deliberation 
become crucial for successful policy 
implementation. The conditions-expe-
cted directions of influence (positive or 
negative) are summarized in Table 1.
outcomes
When it comes to the forms of policy 
change resulting from European Seme-
ster activity, I borrow from the OMC li-
terature (Heidenreich 2009; Barcevičius 
et al. 2014) in distinguishing between 
procedural and substantive shifts. Proce-
dural changes refer to changes in national 
governance and policymaking in a broad 
when proposed policy changes deviate 
from electoral promises, or when they have 
predominantly negative distributive conse-




























































sense, including (1) the establi  shing of 
horizontal and vertical coordination in 
European Semester issues that cut across 
sectors, be it in the form of inter-ministe-
rial coordination, multi-level coopera-
tion (i.e. technical support from EU) or 
between branches of government; (2) the 
inclusion of non-state actors (i.e. social 
partners, NGOs) in decision-making on 
European Semester matters, either throu-
gh newly-created bodies or existing ones, 
and (3) building administrative capaci-
ties (human, organizational resources) or 
establishing new institutions. Substantive 
changes can include direct policy chan-
ge,6 changes in the importance of policy 
problems (preparatory shifts),7 or take 
the form of new agendas set.
6 Meaning, i.e. change in laws and regulati-
ons occurring on three levels (Hall 1993): 
(1) change in the setting of policy instru-
ments – i.e. lowering the duration of unem-
ployment benefits from 12 to 6 months; (2) 
change of existing policy instruments or 
introduction of new ones – i.e. providing 
job counseling; (3) transformative change of 
both policy goals and instruments – i.e. shift 
from passive to active approach by linking 
benefit rights to job-search obligations.
7 When a government initiates discussions, 
starts using EU concepts in debates, frames 
Table 1. Summary of the analytical framework
Mechanisms Conditions Direction (+/-) Policy change






EU support (elite and 
popular) 
Coalition makeup 
(presence of veto players) 























































In this paper I look at the case of Croatia 
to test the analytical framework. Having 
joined the EU only in 2013, Croatia is 
a particularly interesting case for to the 
study of the EU's causal influence. The 
European Semester processes are highly 
politicized in this country, and a great 
number of employment and labor mar-
ket reforms8 have been initiated in the 
meanwhile. On the other hand, Croatia 
has only recently exited the "sticks-and-
carrots" phase of pre-entry negotiations, 
hence might be a good case to see wheth-
er it has either continued "complying" or 
started experiencing integration fatigue. 
Lastly, Croatia has been one of Member 
States with the highest problem load 
on the labor market – recording above 
average unemployment rates, youth un-
policies in accordance with EU initiatives, 
opens discussions/consultations for a pol-
icy, establishes working groups, creates a 
task force or commission, prepares a bill, 
passes a strategic document or action plan.
8 Including the following: introduction of a 
large Youth traineeship program, change 
in the Labor Code, modernisation of the 
Public Employment Service, establishment 
of a new job counselling center(CISOK), 
and the increase of retirement age.
employment rates, inactivity rates, long-
term unemployment rates and early re-
tirement rates. I will focus on the Youth 
Guarantee and the retirement age regu-
lations as two prominent policy items. 
Croatia made substantial progress in 
implementing the Youth Guarantee 
and limited progress on retirement age 
(see section 4.1). This makes the for-
mer a most-likely case, and the later a 
least-likely case (Rohlfing 2016). It is so 
because, from an ex-ante point of view, 
there is less confidence of finding evi-
dence that the European Semester in-
fluenced a policy item in which little or 
no policy change was present. Method-
ologically it is worthwhile studying such 
cases as they may reveal the conditions 
which prevent or reduce the influence of 
the European Semester.
I make use of qualitative data analysis 
to draw conclusions. Eight (semi-struc-
tured) expert interviews have been 
conducted in Croatia in the period July 
2016 – July 2017. The interview coding, 
institutional affiliations and interview 
periods are shown in Table 2. The sam-
pling strategy of this specific paper was 
tailored to cover the insights of senior 
civil servants involved in the day-to-
day activities on the European Semester. 
Table 2. List of expert interviews
Code Current/former institutional affiliation Date Place
A1 Ministry of Labor and Pension System 14/11/2016 Zagreb, HR
A2 Ministry of Labor and Pension System 14/11/2016 Zagreb, HR
A3 Ministry of Labor and Pension System 07/03/2017 Zagreb, HR
B1 Croatian Public Employment Service 11/11/2016 Zagreb, HR
B2 Croatian Public Employment Service 08/03/2017 Zagreb, HR
C1 Representation of the European Commission to Croatia 11/06/2016 Zagreb, HR
D1 Croatian Parliament, European Affairs Committee 15/03/2017 Zagreb, HR




























































These interviews represent the primary 
sources for the empirical part of this pa-
per, supplemented by secondary sourc-
es, ranging from Country Reports, Na-
tional Reform Programs, Country-spe-
cific Recommendations to strategic 
policy documents, laws, regulations and 
evaluation studies. On occasion, I draw 
from newspaper articles and TV news.
The European Semester 
in Action
Five years into deep recession, Croatia 
entered the EU on 1 July 2013 as one 
of EU's countries which were hit the 
hardest by the economic crisis. The la-
bor market was in bad shape due to a 
combination of large external shocks 
(excessive imbalances, deficit and debt 
skyrocketing) and domestic structural 
weaknesses (Brkic 2015: 19). The Croa-
tian youth in particular were facing high 
unemployment rates, prolonged job 
search and inactivity periods resulting 
from the highly cyclical nature of youth 
unemployment (Bejakovic et al. 2015: 
1). They saw their labor market positi-
on deteriorate substantially during the 
crisis years (Vuksic 2014). Fiscal, ma-
croeconomic and employment outlooks 
were rather gloomy as Croatia prepared 
to participate in the 2013 European Se-
mester cycle for the first time, although 
on a voluntary basis. That year, Croatia 
submitted its first informal, and hen-
ce preparatory reform program within 
the European Semester cycle entitled 
"2013 Economic Programme of Croa-
tia". The programme outlined Croatia's 
policy responses to the priorities set in 
the 2013 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
and regarding the Europe 2020 targets. 
The European Commission then publis-
hed a working document (CSWD) with 
the "Assessment of the 2013 economic 
programme for Croatia". No formal co-
untry-specific recommendations were 
made that year; nevertheless, the Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee issued 
a Council conclusion on Croatia, highli-
ghting a number of labor market and 
employment-related issues to be tac-
kled.9 Soon thereafter, Croatia was put 
under the scrutiny of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure. Having breached 
the 3% deficit and 60% debt rule, Croa-
tia entered the excessive deficit procedu-
re (EDP) on 21 January 2014. Likewise, 
the March 2014 In-depth Review ac-
companying the Country Report conc-
luded that Croatia was experiencing 
macroeconomic imbalances due to poor 
competitiveness, weak export position, 
meager growth potential and high exter-
nal liabilities. Findings of these two pro-
cedures would eventually feed into the 
country-specific recommendations in 
the European Semester. The following 
section gives a general overview of Cro-
atian employment issues raised in the 
European Semester setting (2013-2016), 
the procedural changes that were trigge-
red by the European Semester, and the 
capacity of EU fora (primarily EMCO), 
as seen from the perspective of Croatian 
members of EMCO, to foster peer pre-
ssure and mutual learning.
limited policy progress and low 
potential for policy transfer
European Semester matters can be co-
ordinated in multiple ways, both ho-
rizontally and vertically. As one of the 
direct effects of entering the Semester, 
the Croatian Government created an 
inter-ministerial working group un-
der the cap of the Ministry of Regional 
Development and EU Funds. The main 
bulk of work consisted in coordinating 
the procedural obligations within the 
9 Including the rigidity of the Croatian labor 
market; the position of youth; hiring and 
firing costs; disincentives to work; effecti-
veness of active labor market measures; and 

























yearly cycle – the drafting of the Nati-
onal Reform Program being the central 
task. Besides the ministerial level mee-
tings, subgroups were set up, i.e. the 
Working Group on employment policy, 
which would then analyze EU targets, 
recommendations and guidelines on a 
technical level, establish indicators of 
success and monitor progress towards 
goals.10 With the start of the mandate of 
the technocratic government of Tihomir 
Orešković, the central Working Group 
was relocated to the Prime Minister's 
Office, which was evaluated positively 
by European Commission officials. It 
signaled the increase of relevance of the 
European Semester and cast aside po-
tential accusations of catering to speci-
fic interests of the Ministry of Regional 
Development.11 Raising the profile of 
the European Semester continued with 
the new right-wing government led by 
Andrej Plenković. His office stepped up 
efforts to make Croatia's involvement 
in the Semester more transparent by 
bringing the meat of the Semester closer 
to citizens on the official government 
website.12 In general, officials from the 
Ministry of Labor and Pension System 
have the impression that the European 
Semester, acting as a monitoring device, 
"somehow contributed to the under-
standing that policies cannot be created 
as one wishes them to be, but that one 
is to carefully think things through".13 
However, when it comes to issues of ver-
tical coordination between ministers/
decision-makers and experts participa-
ting in the EMCO meetings, the view 
is less optimistic. One EMCO member 
noted that, at times, there was uncerta-
inty regarding the official positions of 
the government: "There were situations 






sition and the position of the competent 
Ministry…I could have relied on my 
professional opinion, but EMCO mem-
bers are not there to do that".14
Two-way communication was also 
poor: direct contacts with the minister 
did not exist, which points to a certain 
disconnection from decision-makers. 
Interviewees were uncertain about 
the impact of their briefing activities: 
"Look, minister's assistants always show 
interest…They are informed, we brief 
them, talk to them and give our com-
ments. Now, what happens afterwards, I 
do not know".15 In sum, communication 
is one-sided, and can be understood as 
providing information to higher lev-
els. A final comment is due regarding 
the relationship between branches of 
government. Despite the fact that Reg-
ulation 1466/2011 calls for a closer in-
volvement of national parliaments and 
relevant stakeholders in activities of 
the cycle, the Croatian context is unfa-
vorable to both. The European Affairs 
Committee of the Croatian Parliament 
participates on a symbolic level –they 
are sometimes informed about the 
content of the National Reform Pro-
gram and Convergence Plan before it 
is passed, but at other occasions this 
is so only afterwards. Either way, there 
are no internal procedures in place to 
outline the cooperation mode between 
the two branches in Semester matters. 
Furthermore, members of the Commit-
tee do not participate in the substantive 
drafting of Semester documents.16 On 
the other hand, social partners are also 
excluded from any substantive involve-
ment in the drafting of the National 
Reform Programme and failure to pro-
mote social dialogue and nurture the 
partnership principle in formulating 































































fied as one of the biggest flaws in the 
policy-making process.17
There is less empirical evidence in 
the Croatian case to support the view 
that the EMCO setting creates space 
for deliberation and consensus-build-
ing, which ought to facilitate mutual 
learning experiences. EMCO meetings 
bring together people from employment 
ministries and public employment ser-
vices, Commission staff and members 
of permanent representations to discuss 
national employment policies and give 
their input to Commission's proposals 
of country-specific recommendations. 
EMCO members generally agree on 
the usefulness of peer review activities; 
however, they are often more of a for-
mality than a true opportunity to learn 
something new. As one member put it: 
"In thematic reviews, everyone is trying 
to sell their own ideas. The Commission 
and the discussant country send in their 
questions in advance…Other colleagues 
seem to be bored, although good prac-
tice examples can be heard".18 Another 
member adds: "…other member states 
do not participate…mostly those pre-
senting after you do not listen. Still, 
there are always class leaders who have 
something to ask".19 On the other hand, 
the meetings are a good opportunity to 
discuss national policy measures more 
deeply in person with Commission staff, 
which can influence what the end ver-
sion of the Country Report looks like.20 
When country-specific recommenda-
tions are discussed, the Commission has 
the rigid attitude, and Member States 
tend to stick together and act support-
ively towards each other.21 When repre-
sentatives were eager to water down or 





21 Interviewees B2 and A1.
mission seemed more prone to stick to 
initial formulations, whereas the Mem-
ber State would lobby for support or 
offer support to other countries' com-
plaints in exchange for support on their 
items.22 These moments in which cer-
tain items with policy implications were 
discussed, either during the votes on 
CSRs or in peer reviews, were described 
as being "not entirely comfortable" and 
"tense".23 What can be concluded from 
this short overview is that EMCO meet-
ings served less the purpose of influenc-
ing policy formulations, but more the 
purpose of becoming informed about 
what lies ahead or what is expected from 
the country in the periods to come. The 
findings of this paper provide support 
to a previous testimony by Coman and 
Ponjaert (2016) who argued that EMCO 
members' interventions stand little 
chance of success against the Commis-
sion's formulations on CSRs.
Turning to European Union's CRSs in 
the field of employment policies, former 
government members emphasize the rel-
ative weakness of the Semester's capacity 
to bring something new to the table in 
terms of policy innovations in active la-
bor market policies or other employment 
measures.24 On the one hand, there was 
little room for novelties, but on the other, 
Croatia had been under a great deal of 
influence from European employment 
initiatives before the country joined the 
EU as well.25 Table 3 summarizes all em-
ployment recommendations to the Cro-
atian National Reform Program issued 
by the Council in the period 2014-2016. 
It lists the topics of items raised, signals 
whether the CSRs were included in other 





26 Which can be said by looking at the formu-
























the degree of implementation of these, 
as evaluated by Commission staff in the 
Country Report.
In 2014, three of the eight CSRs re-
ferred to employment policies, and all of 
them were presented as part of the Mac-
roeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Most 
notably, the Commission had complaints 
about the slow harmonization of male 
and female retirement ages, poor align-
ment of wages with productivity trends, 
the issue of sufficient administrative 
capacities of the Croatian Employment 
Service to perform activation measures, 
as well as weak outreach to non-regis-
tered youth as part of the Youth Guar-
antee scheme. The recommendations 
were quite detailed, contained deadlines 
for implementation and in some cases 
suggested policy means that should be 
used (i.e. increasing the effectiveness 
of the social benefit system by creating 
a one-stop-shop). In the 2015 Country 
Report, substantial or full progress was 
noted with regard to the activation of 
non-registered youth (NEETs) and the 
implementation of the second phase of 
the Labor Code reform. In comparison 
to 2014, CSRs were much more succinct 
in 2015:no deadlines were attached to 
measures, but the recommendations 
still suggested the course of action to be 
taken. Croatia was asked to tackle early 
retirement by raising penalties for early 
exits from the labor market. Also, the 
recommendations once again raised the 
problem of the wage-setting mechanism 
which should follow productivity gains 
and macroeconomic trends. All CSRs 
were again part of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure, but progress in 
all areas was considered limited. Final-
ly, in 2016, the sticky issue of statutory 
retirement age figured prominently in 
the recommendations, as well as the is-
sues of unadjusted wages in the public 
sector and unconsolidated social benefit 
schemes. Despite including deadlines, 
the 2017 Country Report signaled lim-
ited progress. Throughout all three cy-
cles, the CSRs had an economic tone in 
that they asked for fiscal sustainability of 
the pension system or productivity ad-
justments in wage-setting. The fact that 
all CSRs without exception were linked 
to MIP, but, curiously, no impact on the 
compliance record was felt, calls the ef-
fectiveness of the European Semester 
into question. I turn to the examples of 
the Youth Guarantee (substantial pro-
gress) and the retirement age dispute 
(limited progress) to see which causal 
pathways and conditions make the Eu-
ropean Semester relevant and which do 
not.
The youth Guarantee
Youth unemployment became a hot 
topic on the EU agenda only after the 
outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis 
(Chabanet 2014: 489). In April 2013, the 
Council passed a recommendation on 
establishing a Youth Guarantee (2013/C 
120/01) foreseen under the Youth Em-
ployment Package scheme a year earlier. 
The policy idea was simple, namely to 
urge Member States to offer youth aged 
15-24 a good-quality employment, tra-
ining or education opportunity within 
4 months of becoming unemployed or 
exiting the formal education system. 
Although the concept was not entirely 
innovative since similar recommendati-
ons were made a decade earlier within 
the 1998 and 2003 Employment Gui-
delines (Copeland and ter Haar 2015: 
19), the Youth Guarantee quickly gai-
ned traction in the media. Besides the 
central tenet of the Youth Guarantee to 
offer employment, training or education 
within 4 months of unemployment, the 
policy design of the Youth Guarantee 
put special emphasis on reintegration 
into the labor market of vulnerable yo-




























































employed, not in education and not in 
training (so called NEETs).
As far as governance tools are con-
cerned, the Youth Guarantee was pro-
moted through multiple channels – a 
special Council recommendation, in-
dividual CSRs within the Semester, ex-
change of good practices in the mutual 
learning program, progress reports, as 
one of the investment priorities of one of 
the thematic objective in the European 
Social Fund regulation for 2014-2020, 
and as an ex-ante condition (establish-
ing a Youth Guarantee strategic frame-
work). Financial support for the meas-
ure was complemented by the Youth 
Employment Initiative. In governance 
terms, the Youth Guarantee was em-
bedded in the MIP procedure (both as 
an indicator and as a CSR), the Europe 
2020 strategy, and the European Social 
Fund. The interlinkages and comple-
mentarities of these different forms of 
governance procedures and tools, which 
are based on different compliance mech-
anisms, create a conducive environment 
for triggering domestic policy change.
In the 2014 NRP, Croatia announced 
it would accept Council recommenda-
tion and draft a Youth Guarantee Imple-
mentation Plan. It included a detailed 
reform agenda for the future. Passing 
the implementation plan was part of 
the ESF requirements (the so-called ex 
ante condition) to access funding in the 
2014-2020 program. The initial inten-
tion in the Plan was, however, to up-
grade the standard design and try to of-
fer a Youth Guarantee to all youth of up 
to 30 years of age instead. Youth unem-
ployment was a pressing issue in Croa-
tia and the Youth Guarantee resonated 
well with the so-called "Young and Cre-
ative" package of 11 active labor market 
measures already implemented in 2013 
through the Croatian Employment Ser-
vice. The Ministry of Labor and Pension 
System then formed a Council for the 
Implementation of the Youth Guarantee 
representing 17 stakeholders (including 
youth organizations and social partners) 
which worked on an Implementation 
Plan (MLPS 2014) for the Youth Guar-
antee. A Youth Guarantee coordinator 
was in charge of transferring knowledge 
from the Mutual Learning Program, as 
well as to steer the entire policy process.
Since the Youth Guarantee was fi-
nanced through the Operational Pro-
gram Efficient Human Resources agreed 
on only in late 2014, Croatia could not 
capitalize on EU funding for that en-
tire year. A total of EUR 133 million 
was eventually granted for the period 
2014-2020. Croatia did intend to offer a 
measure within 4 months, but a 2015 re-
port showed that only 27 percent27 of all 
potential beneficiaries actually received 
an activation measure within 4 months 
(MLPS 2015: 21). In total, Croatia seems 
to have benefited from positive financial 
incentives from Brussels as it would not 
have been able to finance the measure 
solely through national budget lines. 
From time to time, termination of youth 
workplace training was on the table as 
sources ran out: "Austria, for instance, 
secures the money from the national 
budget and then just recertifies it back 
27 The main reason for the poor perfor-
mance is the small capacity of the Croatian 
Employment Service to process all applica-
tions in a timely manner, reflecting unpre-
paredness to live up to the high bars that 
were set. This risk was identified as a poten-
tial obstacle to full implementation by the 
Commission even before implementation 
started (EC 2014), and the 2016 Country 
Report reiterates the challenges Croatia 
faces in terms of under-capacitated public 
employment services which delay a success-
ful rollout of the Youth Guarantee scheme. 
This policy fiasco is somehow mitigated by 
the fact that the government opened up the 
Youth Guarantee to the 25-30 age group as 
well, therefore increasing the ambition of 
the scheme. Nevertheless, the early inter-
vention aspect of the Youth Guarantee has 























7 from the ESF. In Croatia, instead, we see 
measures being terminated, we run out 
of money…that's the problem".28
As regards the focus on the inactive 
NEETs, Croatia did not have specific 
activities targeting the inactive NEET 
group before the Youth Guarantee. In-
terviewees agree that the European 
Semester put the issue on the national 
policy agenda.29 Although the rate of 
NEETs is much higher in Croatia com-
pared to the EU average (22.3 percent 
28 Interviewee A3.
29 Interviewees A1 and A2.
vs. 15.9 percent for 2013), the Ministry 
of Labor and Pension System conscious-
ly under-prioritized this group because 
it believed the situation was not as criti-
cal as in other countries. Namely, a high 
proportion of those youth consisted of 
tertiary education drop-outs.30
Nevertheless, the feeling among the 
people in charge of the Croatian Youth 
Guarantee was that the Commission 
put additional pressure on the author-
ities to align the national priorities to 
EU's focus on the inactive (NEETs). 
30 Interviewee A2.
Table 3. Employment-related country-specific recommendations for Croatia (2014-
2016)
Year No. Topics Interconne-ctions Progress
2014 3/8
Labor market 
participation, active labor 
market policies, wage-
setting mechanisms, labor 
market segmentation, 
education and training, 





Some: wage setting, tax and 
benefit system, active LMPs, 
undeclared work, education




Labor market, labor 
taxation, wage-setting, 





Limited: early retirement, 
wage-setting, take up of 




of pensions, Incentives to 
work, job creation, labor 
market participation, wage 





No progress: Streamlining 
pension provisions, social 
protection system
Limited: up- and reskilling

































































Demanding reporting obligations re-
flected this administrative pressure on 
the Croatian services, eventually spark-
ing an inter-ministerial initiative to co-
ordinate information on the entry and 
exit of young people in the education, 
labor market and social system in order 
to develop a tracking and monitoring 
system and better target policies rele-
vant to this group. Two officials from 
the Ministry of Labor and Pension Sys-
tem said to that: "This is something the 
Commission pressured us to do (A2) …
Because they constantly haunt you to 
have measures towards inactive (A1) …
But if you realize it is useful and feasi-
ble what the Commission is proposing, 
then you'll do your best to implement it 
(A2)".31 It would seem that the percep-
tion of administrative pressure derives 
from frequent reporting and monitor-
ing activities in the European Semester. 
The Commission would take note of 
domestic initiatives discussed in EMCO 
and frequently check on the "state of 
play" with national counterparts, re-
quest questionnaires to be filled, make 
visits during fact-finding missions and 
generally make frequent inquiries.32 The 
likely reason for the high impact can be 
identified in the low familiarity with 
the European Semester practices and 
the fact that the ministry staff had yet 
to learn how to play the Brussels game. 
As one interviewee put it: "Only now we 
actually start learning how to commu-
nicate with the Commission and how to 
influence what part of their ideas we can 
accept or not".33 The EU accession pro-
cess memory of the compliance mode 
and obedient execution still seems to be 
ingrained in the public administration.34
Even during the accession negotia-
tions it was noted that Croatia's employ-




ment policies were not designed based 
on evidence and policy evaluation. If 
one looks at ALPMs, it is only in the last 
few years that systematic evaluations of 
the effectiveness of ALMPs have been 
conducted in Croatia, owing to EU 
funding (for an overview, see: Bejak-
ovic 2016; for specific evaluation results 
consult: Matkovic et al. 2012; and CES 
2016). Hence, it comes as no surprise 
that continuous monitoring and evalu-
ation of the Youth Guarantee is a poten-
tial bottleneck in the Croatian case. An 
EMCO member recalls how the Com-
mission would put pressure on Croatia 
in the thematic reviews, constantly ask-
ing questions: "Where are your evalua-
tions?"35 Some progress is, nonetheless, 
visible. With the 2014 CSR on building 
the capacity of the Public Employment 
Service, the management of the Croa-
tian Public Employment Service used 
the recommendation as a strategic lever 
to convince decision-makers about the 
necessity to act: "A Slovenian colleague 
once thought me – Use the European Se-
mester for things you otherwise would 
not be able to do because of your pol-
iticians. And we did, when we saw the 
CSR on capacities of the Employment 
Service". For instance, the Ministry of 
Labor and Pension System published 
a progress report in 2015 in which it 
monitored to what extent the proposed 
reform measures were implemented. 
Besides those institutional frameworks 
for monitoring active labor market pol-
icies, an advanced labor market moni-
toring system is currently being set up 
which will aggregate life-cycle data on 
education, employment and unemploy-
ment entries and exits of individuals 
with the purpose of monitoring employ-
ment and salary developments across 
sectors and occupations in real time 
(GRC 2015; MLPS 2015). This measure 
intends to address objections from the 

























regards the high mismatch between la-
bor market needs and educational out-
comes. Again, interviews confirm that 
this policy innovation was also fueled by 
the Youth Guarantee: "First we only saw 
the recommendation suggesting activa-
tion within 4 months, but eventually it 
produced many more structural chang-
es".36 If one remembers that the Youth 
Guarantee Implementation Plan had to 
be passed to qualify for ESF funding, 
it becomes evident that this formal re-
quirement sparked further monitoring 
and reporting activities and eventually 
led to structural changes.
It can be concluded that the Croatian 
Youth Guarantee scheme built heavi-
ly on pre-existing policy initiatives for 
the youth (mostly the workplace train-
ing without commencing work) and 
utilized the momentum at the EU lev-
el to further promote a very one-sided 
Youth Guarantee model that neglected 
the employment and education aspect 
of the Guarantee, but relied heavily on 
traineeship schemes. A high-profile of-
ficial from the Public Employment Ser-
vice reflected: "The Youth Guarantee is 
a good instrument, but all the money 
was thrown into activation measures".37 
The Milanovic Government repeatedly 
took credit for implementing the Youth 
Guarantee, framing it as a truly Croatian 
initiative without any reference to the 
EU level, both in promotional material 
and ahead of the 2015 general elections.38 
It publicly promoted the initiative as 
their brainchild. Although progress in 
terms of creating more targeted meas-
ures for unemployed youth following 
the adoption of the Youth Guarantee 
cannot be denied, it is more interesting 
to note the soft administrative pressure 
36 Interviewee A2.
37 Interviewee B2.
38 In the party manifesto, however, they do 
refer to the Youth Guarantee as a ''EU pro-
ject'' (SDP 2015: 28).
that was applied by the Commission to 
reach out to inactive NEETs and mon-
itor labor market developments. In 
general, officials from the Ministry of 
Labor and Pension System had the feel-
ing that the Commission tried to en-
force the Council recommendation in 
a directive-like manner: "We were told 
it's a recommendation, that you can get 
money for it, that it's country-specific…
but in the end, we implement it as if it 
a directive, for God sake. It really feels 
that way".39 Demanding reporting obli-
gations eventually "forced" the authori-
ties to put more emphasis on the inac-
tive NEETs and to upgrade monitoring 
tools. In general, however, the Croa-
tian Youth Guarantee strategically used 
EU-proposed policy measures to bolster 
a pre-defined reform agenda (primarily 
in relation to the work-place training 
scheme). EU moneys were heavily mo-
bilized and contributed to ongoing in-
cremental changes in the policy design 
and institutional framework for youth 
employment policies in Croatia. The 
findings largely support expectations on 
the effects of monitoring and reporting 
obligations on policy change. Empirical 
evidence, particularly on the crucially 
supportive role that ESF money and ex 
ante conditions had on the Youth Guar-
antee recommendation, confirms that 
external incentives were a major facili-
tator of policy change.
regulation of (early) retirement
Croatia is no exception when it comes 
to the old-continent syndrome. The 
situation in Croatia is, however, parti-
cularly severe compared to other EU 
Member States. Croatia records some 
of the worst results on a broad scale of 
indicators: duration of working life, pro-
portion of early retirements, activity rate 
of older people, proportion of disabili-





























































just to mention a few. To this end, the 
European Commission has persistently 
been proposing measures to discourage 
and penalize more stringently early re-
tirement, to improve active ageing, to 
increase the statutory retirement age, to 
streamline criteria for special pensions 
and disability pensions and to improve 
the fiscal sustainability of the pension 
system. The overview of CSRs in Table 
3 has shown that this hot topic area fi-
gures highly on the list of employment 
recommendations even after the acces-
sion to the EU. Special emphasis on the 
side of the EU has been placed on the 
regulation of statutory retirement age 
and the gender mismatch (disharmony).
Similar to other CSRs, the one that 
stresses the need to harmonize the 
retirement age for male and female 
workers has been linked to the Macro-
economic Imbalance Procedure. Other 
governance mechanisms and instru-
ments on the EU level that focus the 
attention on how to increase retirement 
age include the 2010 Council conclu-
sions on active ageing, the annual Ac-
tive ageing report coordinated by the 
Commission – hence, mostly non-in-
trusive, soft tools. Still, empirical evi-
dence suggests that the Commission's 
involvement resembles the hardening 
of soft procedures, strikingly so within 
the EMCO settings. In the assessment of 
the Croatian 2014 National Reform Pro-
gram, the Commission battered the re-
tirement age harmonization process as 
not "sufficiently ambitious" (EC 2014a: 
15). Although the working document 
does blame Croatia for not taking oth-
er action to discourage early retirement 
(apart from stricter disability pension 
test now being applied), raising the stat-
utory retirement age from 65 to 67 and 
equalizing the retirement age for both 
genders as soon as possible was central 
in the discussions in the Employment 
Committee as well. Interviewee data 
suggests that the European Commission 
repeatedly insisted that the harmoniza-
tion of statutory retirement age be ac-
celerated, despite the fact that the Social 
Democratic government passed a new 
Pension Insurance Law in 2013 which 
stipulated that a gradual phasing in of a 
harmonized male and female statutory 
retirement age would be completed by 
2038. At that point, both genders would 
have to retire at a later age than before 
– at 67 years of age. Participants in the 
EMCO meetings report that the discus-
sion on this particular CSR was noth-
ing but consensus-building and open 
for negotiations: "The Commission was 
very aggressive towards Croatia, which 
prompted Member States' reactions. 
The Commission's argumentation was 
not strong, their positions was rather to 
point to things that Croatia did not ful-
fill, a position that was very domineer-
ing, and which lead to antagonisms, that 
is, greater support and sympathy for the 
Croatian position".40 This confirms to a 
certain degree previous findings that the 
Commission is not giving in to the hard 
sell by Member States and perseveres in 
its strives.
Surprisingly, the Milanovic Govern-
ment decided not to follow the usual 
informal practice of paying at least lip 
service to the official CSRs when the 
recommendations go the opposite di-
rection from the preferred policy bent. 
Instead, the 2015 NRP bluntly refused to 
follow the recommendation to increase 
the statutory retirement age to 67 earlier 
and to harmonize statutory retirement 
age for men and women faster. The for-
mer Minister of Labor and Pension Sys-
tem publicly rejected any thought about 
listening to the advice from Brussels. In-
terestingly, the CSRs that were issued af-
ter the NRP was submitted omitted any 
reference to speeding up, but focused 

























and gaps between statutory and early re-
tirement age provisions. A former gov-
ernment member recalls that this was 
a huge point of confrontation between 
the European Commission and Croa-
tia.41 However, the Croatian government 
managed to convince the Commission 
that a faster equalization would be det-
rimental to the Croatian workers. The 
argument was that the life expectancy 
of Croatian workers was below the EU 
average, thus any action to accelerate 
the harmonization of the retirement age 
would be catastrophic.42 This explains 
why the Commission stopped insisting 
on this policy measure in the following 
iteration. However, besides those strong 
policy convictions that guided the Mi-
lanovic Government to confront the 
Commission and the fact that it was a 
sensitive policy issue, one must consider 
the political context of that moment. The 
Milanovic coalition government had a 
thin majority in the parliament, and one 
of the coalition partners was the Croa-
tian Party of Pensioners, holding 4 man-
dates – enough to act as a game changer 
or veto player. It was believed that suc-
cumbing to the Commission's pressure 
on that item could have splintered the 
coalition's voting base, and eventually 
lead to intra-coalition tensions.43 In a 
nutshell, three conditions inhibited any 
progress on that issue: the fact that the 
topic was highly sensitive, that the gov-
ernment's argument was strong and the 
coalition make-up.
In 2016, the issue was back on the 
table after a seemingly dramatic joint 
press conference44 by Commissioner 
and vice-president of the Commission 
Valdis Dombrovskis and the techno-
cratic Prime Minister Tihomir Orešk-




44 See: Večernji.hr (2016).
Country Report. Commenting on the 
assessment of Croatia's progress on 
CSRs, Orešković hinted that the Eu-
ropean Commission could initiate an 
Excessive Imbalances Procedure, an en-
hanced monitoring mechanism within 
the framework of the Macroeconom-
ic Imbalance Procedure in which the 
Commission could propose corrective 
measures. Commission staff confirmed45 
that at that point the Commission was 
most determinate in updating Croatia's 
status in the MIP to the worse. The term 
"corrective measures" soon echoed in 
the public, evoking thoughts on sanc-
tions (HRT 2016). Although the proce-
dure foresees no penalties for non-Euro-
zone member states, media outlets and 
economic experts alike sent out threat-
ening, at times contradictory messages. 
In reality, Croatia could only risk sus-
pension of funds if it did not seriously 
engage in potential corrective actions. 
Vice-president Dombrovskis practically 
engaged in a naming-and-shaming ex-
ercise that was heavily followed by the 
media. Still, the right-wing government 
reacted fast to the threat of sanctions 
and decided to revive the retirement age 
issue in the 2016 National Reform Pro-
gram. The government pledged to ac-
celerate the equalization and oblige both 
male and female workers to work until 
the age 67, starting with the year 2027. 
The Plenković Government stayed com-
mitted to the same cause; however, no 
legislative changes had yet been initiated 
at the time of writing this paper.
Conclusion
This paper drew on expert interviews 
to study the impact of European Seme-
ster policy coordination on Croatian 
employment policies. The results of 
the study are largely in line with simi-
lar research (Louvaris Fasois 2016) in 





























































its standard reporting procedures and 
intensified monitoring activities, can 
guide Member States to focus on spe-
cific employment goals. Much of the 
OMC literature findings resonate well 
with the empirical evidence in this pa-
per. The Croatian government made 
ideational use of European initiatives 
(Youth Guarantee, active ageing) to pro-
mote pre-existing reform agendas, sta-
keholders used the European Semester 
recommendations as levers to promote 
their priorities (Croatian Employment 
Service's evaluation capacities) and in-
ternal government procedures were 
adjusted to the coordination require-
ments of the European Semester. Most 
importantly, the European Commission 
was able to exert adaptational pressure 
on the Youth Guarantee implementation 
through intensified monitoring within 
the European Semester. Interview data 
indicated that civil servants were caught 
by surprise and did not know how to 
resist the pressure to comply, even tho-
ugh the Commission had no hard tools 
to enforce their requests. This would 
indicate the importance of multi-level 
socialization in EU's socio-economic 
governance framework. Being new to 
the procedure, the domestic level was at 
first very receptive to EU-level impulses 
on the YG. The more accustomed the 
public administration becomes to bila-
teral interactions on soft policy matters, 
the more likely it is that, sooner or later, 
they will develop strategies on how to 
prevent unwanted requests, and resist 
existing ones. The added value of this 
study is that it managed to avoid a po-
sitive selection of cases that confirm EU 
influence. The example of retirement 
policy clearly highlights the limits of Eu-
ropean Semester penetration, and both 
scholars and policy-makers should ac-
count for factors that might hinder po-
licy transfers. Finally, the intensification 
of EU activity in soft law areas such as 
employment policy is not without risks. 
Scholarly research has already identified 
the danger of over-bureaucratizing the 
European Semester (Maricut and Pu-
etter 2018). Besides, some governments 
from Central and Eastern European 
countries, although welcoming the Eu-
ropean Semester, have already expres-
sed concerns about the complex system. 
Reflecting on the 5 years of the Europe 
2020 strategy (mid-term review), they 
describe the Semester as "administra-
tively demanding"46, criticize the tight 
schedules47 which leave little room for 
genuine dialogue and policy reflection, 
expose the oversupply of sometimes 
overlapping documents, initiatives and 
reports,48 and emphasize that strategies 
such as the Agenda for new skills and 
jobs "have not proved to be a catalyst of 
strategically oriented and coherent ini-
tiatives with clear priorities".49 Hence 
the attention of the EU, especially in the-
se challenging times for the European 
project, should shift to legitimacy-buil-
ding of the European Semester so that 
the risks of backlashes from the capitals 
are avoided. Some movement in the ri-
ght direction can be observed, such as in 
deploying the European Semester Offi-
cers to capitals or in providing technical 
support for structural reforms so as to 
increase the domestic ownership of the 
European Semester and reform proces-
ses. Future research should give an an-
swer to the question to what extent the 
European Semester has the capacity to 
engage in deeper dialogue with national 
capitals, encourage stakeholder involve-
ment and build acceptance of its reform 
agenda.
46 Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic 
(2014).
47 The Government of the Czech Republic 
(2014); Ministry of Finance of the Republic 
of Bulgaria (2014).
48 Ministry of Economics of the Republic of 
Latvia (2014).
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Utjecaj Europskog semestra na politike 
zapošljavanja u Hrvatskoj, 2013-2016.
Sažetak Članak analizira učinke Europskog semestra, okvira Eu-a za socijalno-eko-
nomsku koordinaciju, na promjenu politike zapošljavanja u hrvatskoj. Slučaj hrvat-
ske treba ilustrirati kako, pod kojim uvjetima i u kojoj mjeri arhitektura Europskog 
semestra utječe na politike zapošljavanja u hrvatskoj. u žarištu su analize dvije 
stavke javnih politika: Garancija za mlade i dob za umirovljenje. nalazi vezani za 
Garanciju za mlade podržavaju očekivanje prema kojemu pojačani nadzor i obve-
ze izvještavanja pridonose promjeni nacionalnih javnih politika. Koristeći intervjue 
kao izvore podataka, auto pronalazi dva ključna elementa utjecaja: administrativni 
pritisak i slabu upoznatost s načinom rada Europske komisije u sklopu Europskog 
semestra. Istodobno, hrvatska je opetovano zanemarivala preporuke za usklađiva-
njem dobi umirovljenja za muškarce i žene. razlozi slaba utjecaja Europskog seme-
stra na tom području mogu se pronaći u ograničavajućem efektu sastava koalicijske 
vlade, krutosti javne politike, suprotstavljenih uvjerenja i vrlo neizvjesne političke 
situacije. Ti su uvjeti bili čimbenici odvraćanja od promjene javnih politika, unatoč 
mogućim sankcijama Eu-a.
Ključne riječi Europski semestar, europeizacija, politike zapošljavanja, hrvatska, 
Garancija za mlade, umirovljenje
